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Abstract: This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework to analyze the impact of 
India’s largest public works program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(NREGS), on schooling enrollment, grade progression, reading comprehension test 
scores, writing test scores, math test scores and Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) 
scores. The availability of pre and two rounds of post-intervention initiation data from the 
three rounds of the Young Lives Panel Study allow us to measure both the short- and 
medium-run intent-to-treat effects of the program. We find that the program has no effect 
on enrollment but has strong positive effects on grade progression, reading 
comprehension test scores, math test scores and PPVT scores. The average effect size 
computed over several outcomes is similar to the effects of conditional cash transfer 
programs implemented in Latin America. These short-run impact estimates all increased 
in the medium run, that is, there is no decaying of impact but instead medium-run 
augmentation of the estimated short-run effects. The findings reported here are robust to 
attrition bias, endogenous program placement, type I errors and type II errors. 
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1. Introduction 
During the fiscal year 2013-2014, the government of India allocated over US$ 5.5 billion 
for its largest public works program and flagship social protection program, the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS).5 The NREGS provides 100 days of 
unskilled wage employment to any household residing in poor rural areas whose adult 
members chose to work in the program. Employment opportunities made available in the 
NREGS are closely tied to the construction and maintenance of public goods in the 
community. Despite public works programs offering a promising solution for some 
dimensions of poverty eradication, critics of these programs have expressed skepticism 
about their usefulness.  
Existing evaluation studies of the NREGS suggest positive impacts on employment, 
consumption expenditure and income. Ravi and Engler (2009) use both cross-sectional 
and panel data from Medak district in Andhra Pradesh and find that per capita 
expenditure on food and certain categories of non-food consumables and the probability 
of savings are all higher among households that participate in the NREGS. Liu and 
Deininger (2010) use panel data from five districts in Andhra Pradesh and find that 
participating households have higher per capita consumption expenditure and aggregate 
calorie and protein intakes in comparison to non-participating households. Azam (2011) 
expands the analysis of the program using nationally representative data from multiple 
rounds of the National Sample Survey and finds that the implementation of the NREGS is 
positively related to increases in male and female labor force participation rates and real 
wages for men and women with the effects being stronger and larger for women. 
Evaluation studies using data from other states of India conducted with varying degrees 
of rigor also report positive benefits associated with access and participation in the 
scheme [Tiwari et. al 2011, Nayak and Khera 2009]. All the studies reviewed in 
Subbarao (2003) and Betcherman et. al (2000) on other public works programs than the 
NREGS focus on household-level outcomes and individual-level labor market outcomes 
and in general find positive effects of public works program on labor force participation 
and consumption expenditure. 
Anti-poverty programs like the NREGS, however, are often argued to serve as policy 
instruments for multidimensional poverty alleviation, not just consumption expenditure 
and therefore likely to improve educational outcomes for children in multiple ways. First, 
the NREGS is likely to directly result in changes in parents’ labor supply decisions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-Budget-2013/Chunk-HT-UI-IndiaBudget2013-Economy/NREGA-losing-sheen-
Allocation-unchanged/SP-Article1-1019269.aspx 
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which are positively (negatively) related to improvements in children’s schooling if the 
income (substitution) effect outweighs the substitution (income) effect.6 Second, the 
NREGS can increase schooling outcomes through improvements in community-level 
public good provision such as improvements in roads, and water supplies. Third, the 
NREGS can result in improvements in household income/per capita consumption that are 
not led by increased labor force participation but instead by improvements in community-
level infrastructure targeted at flood control, land development and maintenance of 
irrigation system and canals.7 Since, there are multiple channels through which the 
NREGS may affect children’s outcomes, attempting to capture these effects through 
parents’ labor force participation alone, as has been the focus in most of the literature on 
effects of the NREGS to date, can therefore result in misleading findings about the net 
effect of the NREGS on measures of intellectual human capital.  
While the large literature summarized above examines the effectiveness of NREGS on 
employment, consumption expenditure and income, there is very limited direct evidence 
on how such programs benefit children. Three exceptions are Uppal, 2009; Afridi et. al 
2012 and Dasgupta 2013, but none of these papers have examined the impact of the 
NREGS on grade progression and measures of cognitive skills, which in recent studies 
have been found to be more strongly related to wage earnings than schooling attainment.8  
To close this important gap in the literature, we use a quasi-experimental approach to 
examine the net effect of the NREGS on children’s enrollment, grade progression, 
reading comprehension test scores, writing test scores, math test scores and PPVT scores, 
using data from three rounds of the Young Lives Panel Study in India. We combine pre- 
and post- intervention initiation data in an experimental framework to measure the short- 
and medium-run effects of the NREGS on intellectual human capital.   
The NREGS was rolled out in a phased-in manner, the first phase of the program was 
rolled out between the 2002 (round 1) and 2007 (round 2) waves of the Young Lives 
Panel Study and targeted approximately 200 poorest rural districts of India. By the end of 
the third round of the Young Lives Panel Study in 2009-10 (and Phase II and III of the 
nation wide program rollout), the NREGS was placed in all remaining rural districts in 
India. We combine the availability of pre- and two rounds of post intervention initiation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Behrman and Knowles (1999) for a review on the relationship between household consumption and schooling 
investments in children. 
7 Dasgupta (2013) finds that it is only children exposed to drought shocks in the past that benefit from the NREGS. 
8 For instance, Behrman et. al (2009), using data from Guatemala and treating all measures of human capital as endogenous, 
show that, controlling for height and fat-free body mass, improvements in reading comprehension test scores rather than 
schooling attainment are related to increases in earnings. 
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data in a quasi-experimental framework to examine the intent-to-treat effects of the 
NREGS on measures of children’s intellectual human capital. 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to quantify the short- and medium-run intent-to-
treat effects of having access to the NREGS on schooling and intellectual human capital.  
A number of important findings emerge from our analysis. First, we find that NREGS 
was primarily placed initially in poor communities. We find that communities that have 
higher levels of pre-intervention population, and fewer hospitals and health centers were 
more likely to receive the program first. Therefore controlling for program placement is 
important for our investigation, which we do through first-differencing. Second, the 
NREGS has no effect on schooling enrollment, a relatively short-run measure of 
investment in intellectual human capital. Third, access to the program has large and 
positive effects on children’s performance on reading comprehension, math and PPVT 
scores, relatively longer-run measures of intellectual human capital. The average effect 
size in the short run suggests a 0.08 standard deviation improvement in schooling and 
cognitive outcomes for children assigned to the early phase-in NREGS districts in 
comparison to children not assigned to the program early on. Fourth, short-run effects of 
the program are all sustained in the medium run, that is, there is no decaying of observed 
treatment effects but instead augmentation of short-run treatment effects. The medium-
run average effect size increases to 0.15 standard deviations indicating a persistent 
difference in cognitive outcomes between children living in the early phase-in districts 
and late phase-in districts. Finally, our impact estimates are robust to a number of 
concerns – attrition bias, type I errors, type II errors, and endogenous program placement. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A complete description of the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme is provided in section 2. Data description and 
summary statistics are provided in section 3. The conceptual framework is outlined in 
section 4. Findings are reported in section 5. Finally, concluding remarks follow in 
section 6. 
2. The program: National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
NREGS came into effect in September 2005 and is effective in all states of India since 
then except for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where it came into effect in December 
2007. On 2nd October 2009 the National Rural Employment Guarantee act was renamed 
as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA).9 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 We use the term National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) throughout the paper even though the name 
was changed to Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) in 2009 because NREGS 
was the name for the period studied. 
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act guarantees at least 100 days of unskilled wage employment to any household residing 
in rural areas whose adult members (18 years and older) chose to work in the program. 
The Act also sets aside a special quota for women; at least one-third of all beneficiaries in 
the program must be women. It also requires that a 60:40 wage-to-material ratio be 
maintained in all public works projects. 
 
The NREGS focuses on the construction of community-wide assets targeted to improve 
water conservation and rain water collection, rural connectivity, flood control, irrigation 
canals, drought proofing, and land development. The adult household member interested 
in seeking unskilled wage employment as part of this scheme has to submit an application 
to the Gram Panchayat (village council). This application is further sent to the Mandal 
Computer Centre (MCC) for the creation of a job card. This job card is used to seek 
unskilled employment in the village and, at least per the act, the entire application process 
has to be completed within 15 days of submitting the application. If employment is not 
provided to the job seeker within 15 days of the application, then the state is required to 
compensate the job seeker for delays by paying an unemployment allowance. 
 
The NREGS was rolled out in three phases. During phase I, between September 2005 and 
February 2006, the scheme was targeted to the 200 poorest districts in India identified 
using the backwardness index developed by the Sharma Committee in the Planning 
Commission. By May 2007 the second phase of the program was rolled out and covered 
an additional 130 districts and finally by April 2008 the program reached out all 
remaining rural districts in India. This is India’s largest public works program aimed at 
eradicating rural poverty. 
 
The Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India (2006-2007 annual report) 
shows that more than 200 million households, of which over 10% resided in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh alone, were employed under the NREGS during 2006-2007. Given the 
large-scale nature of this public works program, it has generated great interest among 
policy makers and academicians to understand the effectiveness and benefits of this anti-
poverty program. However, as noted earlier in the introduction, to date there is no 
evidence on how the NREGS affects children’s grade progression and cognitive 
development. In this paper our focus is to provide evidence on the impact of the NREGS 
on grade progression and cognitive development, which in the long run are strongly 
related to economic and social well-being.  
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3. Data 
 
3.1 Young Lives Panel Study 
The data used in this paper comes from the Young Lives Panel Study – a panel survey 
that collects a rich set of data on children’s human capital (health, schooling, cognition, 
illness), parents’ human capital (completed grades of schooling and height), household 
assets, household per capita consumption expenditure, and incidence of shocks from 
children in four different countries – Ethiopia, India (only includes the state of Andhra 
Pradesh), Peru and Vietnam. The Young Lives sample in Andhra Pradesh was selected 
from 20 sentinel sites and within each site, 100 households with a 1-year-old child 
(younger cohort) and 50 households with an 8-year-old child (older cohort) were 
randomly selected for survey purposes in 2002 (round 1). The younger cohort (1-year-old 
in 2002) and the older cohort (7-8-years-old in 2002) were subsequently re-surveyed 
during the 2007 (round 2), and the 2009-10 (round 3) waves of the survey. Our analysis 
sample is restricted to only include the older cohort since the majority of the pre-
intervention data collected in 2002 on grade progression, reading comprehension, and 
writing ability are only available for this cohort. The sentinel sites were chosen to 
represent all three agro-climatic (Coastal Andhra Pradesh, Rayalseema, and Telangana) 
regions of Andhra Pradesh. See Kumra (2008) for further details on the sampling 
approach adopted by the Young Lives Panel Study in Andhra Pradesh. 
 
The Young Lives Panel Study covers the following six districts – Cuddapah, Anantapur, 
Mahbubnagar, Karimnagar, West Godavari, Srikakulam and the city of Hyderabad in 
Andhra Pradesh (see Figure 1).  Since the primary objective of this paper is examine the 
impact of the NREGS, which is only implemented in rural areas, we restrict our analysis 
sample to only include rural areas. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was 
enacted in 2005 and by 2007 (round 2) implemented in four (Cuddapah, Anantapur, 
Mahbubnagar, Karimnagar) of the six Young Lives districts in Andhra Pradesh. By the 
second round of Young Lives data collection in January-June 2007, 70% of the sample 
residing in the NREGS districts were registered in the NREGS, suggesting sufficient 
coverage of the program to have had effects on schooling outcomes during this period. 
By the third round of the Young Lives Panel Study in 2009-10, the NREGS was phased-
in all remaining rural districts in India including the remaining two districts (West 
Godavari and Srikakulam) in the Young Lives Panel Study in Andhra Pradesh. By this 
time, approximately 81% of the households residing in the early phase-in districts and 
75% of the households residing in the late phase-in districts were registered in the 
NREGS. We combine this cross-sectional and temporal variation in the introduction of 
the NREGS program across the Young Lives sample to examine the short- and medium-
run effect of access to this scheme on measures of schooling and cognitive development. 
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             Figure 1: Young Lives sites in Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
 
3.2 Key Variables 
We focus on six outcome variables of interest – enrollment, a measure for short-run 
investments in intellectual human capital, and five other longer-run measures of 
intellectual human capital including grade progression, reading comprehension test scores, 
writing test scores, math test scores and Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) scores. 
These longer-run measures of cognitive development are strongly related to wage 
earnings [see Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) for a review of studies from both 
developed and developing nations]. 
 
Enrollment here is defined as a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if currently enrolled 
in school and zero otherwise. Figure 2 below shows that 97% of children are enrolled in 
school at the time of the survey in round 1 and this number decreases by almost 10 
percentage points by round 2 when the children are 12 years old and further decreases to 
75% when the average age of the child in the sample increases to 15 years. It is not 
surprising that enrollment decreases with age in this context.10 In the results section we 
will further examine if the decrease in enrollment is smaller among children who had 
earlier access to the NREGS compared to children who had later exposure to the scheme. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 We compute enrollment rates for school-age children using data on five of the six Young Lives Districts covered by the 
2005 Indian Human Development Survey to find similar patterns in the relationship between age and enrollment. See 
Figure A1 in the appendix. 
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Figure 2: Enrollment by Year in Rural AP 
 
 
 
Grade progression here is defined as completed grades of schooling divided by the 
potential grades where potential grades are calculated as total number of grades 
accumulated had the individual completed one grade of schooling by age 6 and continued 
to accumulate an additional grade of schooling in each subsequent year. Grade 
progression has the following advantages over the popularly used completed grades of 
schooling – (a) children with the same completed grades of schooling, some of whom 
still in school, are treated differently depending upon their age, except if the actual 
completed grade is zero11 and (b) observations on completed grades of schooling are 
right-censored for children currently enrolled in school resulting in censoring that biases 
the estimated effect of the NREGS program downwards (Tansel, 1997). We could follow 
the censored ordered probit specification used by King and Lillard (1983, 1987). 
However, this approach relies on the strong assumption that children who belong to the 
uncensored category (not enrolled) in any one period do not re-enter schools. We find 
that this assumption is frequently violated in our sample: approximately 70% of children 
not enrolled in school during 2002 have re-entered school by 2007 and 7% of children 
not enrolled in school during 2007 have re-entered school by 2009-10. Grade progression 
does not suffer from some of the shortcomings outlined above and hence is preferred over 
completed grades of schooling, the more popular measure of schooling.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In our sample, approximately 1% of the children have zero grades of schooling. 
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We also use test score data from reading comprehension tests and writing ability tests that 
were administered to children in rounds 1 and 2. The reading comprehension test scores 
are coded on a scale of 0 to 3 [0=cannot read anything, 1=read letters, 2=read words, 
3=read sentences]. The writing ability test scores are coded on a scale of 0 to 2 
[0=nothing, 1=yes with difficulties, 2= yes without difficulties]. These tests are similar to 
the reading comprehension and writing tests administered by the Annual Status of 
Education Report (2012), which releases India’s largest report card on schooling to give 
up-to-date information on children’s schooling performance all over India. 
 
During rounds 2 and 3, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), a widely-used 
measure of receptive vocabulary, and math tests were administered to all children. To 
capture relative performance and also to make the test results comparable over time, we 
construct percentile ranks for the math and PVVT scores in each round. Cueto and Leon 
(2012) show that there is significant positive correlation between PVVT scores collected 
in rounds 2 and 3. They also show that the levels of item difficulty in PPVT are not 
identical across waves and hence it is recommended to compute the relative position of 
the child’s performance in each round, as we do using the percentile ranks here. Changes 
in item difficulty are captured by the variation in raw test scores over time across the 
math and vocabulary tests. The distribution of the raw test scores and the test scores in 
percentile ranks (adjusted for relative performance) are reported in Appendix Figures A2-
A7. 
 
Summary statistics on all outcome variables are reported below in Table 1, Panel A. 
Enrollment decreases from 97% in round 1 to 75% in round 3. Grade progression 
increases between the first and second rounds of data collection but decreases marginally 
by round 3, which coincides with the rollout of the NREGS into all remaining rural 
districts. Reading comprehension and writing ability both improved between waves 1 and 
2. The raw scores on the math test and PPVT have also improved over time. In Table 1, 
Panel B we also provide the means and standard deviations on all pre-intervention right-
side variables included in the final regressions. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Outcome variables 2002 
Mean 
(s.d) 
2007 
Mean 
(s.d) 
2009-10 
Mean 
(s.d) 
Enrollment  
 
0.97 
(0.16) 
0.88 
(0.32) 
0.75 
(0.43) 
Grade progression 0.85 0.89 0.88 
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(0.35) (0.18) (0.18) 
Reading comprehension test scores 1.99 
(1.05) 
2.64 
(0.81) 
NA 
Writing test scores 1.21 
(0.80) 
1.60 
(0.60) 
NA 
Raw math test scores NA 5.57 
(2.27) 
8.89 
(5.90) 
Raw PPVT scores NA 87.36 
(24.59) 
127.44 
(40.27) 
Math test scores (in percentile ranks) NA 50 50 
  (28.46) (28.83) 
PPVT scores (in percentile ranks) NA 50 
(28.88) 
50 
(28.88) 
Panel B: Control Variables 2002 
Male dummy (=1 if male, 0 = female) 0.48 
(0.50) 
Age in months 96.31 
(3.95) 
Household size 5.58 
(2.06) 
Number of school-age children 1.40 
(1.03) 
Wealth index 0.33 
(0.16) 
Raven’s test scores 22.63 
(5.20) 
SC/ST dummy (=1 if Scheduled caste/Scheduled 
tribe, 0 otherwise) 
0.38 
(0.48) 
OBC dummy (=1 if other backward class, 0 
otherwise) 
0.47 
(0.49) 
Religion dummy (=1 if Hindu, 0 otherwise) 0.91 
(0.28) 
Mother’s schooling (completed grades) 1.79 
(3.07) 
Father’s schooling (completed grades) 3.55 
(4.43) 
Sample size 703 
Notes: The sample covers rural areas only. 
 
On average 48% of the children in our sample are male and approximately 64% of the 
sample is 7 years old in 2002 and the remaining 36% is 8 years old. The average 
household of a Young Lives child has four other members co-residing of whom there is 
on average at least one school age sibling of the child. The children are primarily Hindu 
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(91%) and around 85% of the sample belongs to backward castes (SC/ST = 38% and 
OBC = 47%). Average completed grades of schooling among parents are, not 
surprisingly, low in our sample. Mothers have completed on average less than 2 grades 
and fathers less than 4 grades of schooling. The wealth index is computed as a weighted 
average of a housing quality index (based on the number of rooms per person and the 
materials used for construction of the house), a consumer durables index (based on 
ownership of assets) and a services index (based on whether or not the household has 
access to key resources including but not limited to drinking water, electricity, and 
toilets) where each of the sub-categories is weighted equally in the index.12 The wealth 
index takes a value between 0 and 1. The average value of 0.33 suggests that on average 
a household has only one-third of all possible resources (assets, services and durables), 
which suggest that children in our sample reside in extremely poor households. The 
Young Lives Panel Study also administered Raven’s progression matrices to children in 
round 1 only; these scores are additionally controlled in the right-side of the first-
difference specification to account for pre-intervention differences in analytical reasoning 
ability. The average child scores approximately 61% on the pre-intervention Raven’s test 
administered at age 8. 
 
3.3 Sample Attrition 
The older cohort includes approximately 1000 children surveyed during 
September-December 2002 of which 757 resided in rural areas. During round 2, 
implemented during January-April 2007, the Young Lives Panel Study was able to trace 
approximately 97% (N=731) of the round 1 rural respondents and in round 3, 
implemented during August 2009-January 2010, the study was able to trace 
approximately 95% (N=719) of the rural children surveyed in rounds 1 and 2.13 The 
overall rate of sample attrition is very low, with only around 5% of the children lost over 
a 7-year period, and results in an attrition rate of less than 1% per annum. We restrict our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See UK Data Archive Study Number 5307 - Young Lives: an International Study of Childhood Poverty: Round 1, 2002 
for further details on the construction of the wealth index. 
13 The usual school year in India begins in April and ends in March. Children surveyed during the 2002 and 2009-10 waves 
of the Young Lives study all belong to the same school year except for 20% of the children surveyed during round 2 in 
April and May 2007 (next school year). This would bias our estimates only if the children surveyed during the later months 
were systematically higher in the treatment districts in comparison to the control districts. We find that in treatment 
districts, 24% of the children were surveyed later and a similar proportion, 22% of children were surveyed later in the 
control districts in 2007. This difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels of significance [p-value = 
0.46]. Further, the timing of the survey will only affect the computation of one variable, grade progression. We re-estimate 
our preferred estimates for grade progression adjusting for the difference in the timing of the survey in Appendix Table A2. 
We find no difference between the treatment effects reported in column 2 Panel B Table 4 for grade progression and 
Appendix Table A2. We can further account for changes in performance associated with the timing of the survey with the 
inclusion of a dummy variable which takes a value 1 if you were surveyed later in 2007, 0 otherwise. We re-estimate our 
preferred estimates reported in Panel B Table 4 with this additional control variable and find no difference in the treatment 
effects reported in Table 4. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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analysis sample further to include only children who resided in the same rural district 
over all three rounds to be able to disentangle migration effects from the program effects, 
which are correlated both spatially and temporally. We lose only about 16 observations 
by imposing this restriction. Our final analysis sample includes 703 children residing in 
rural Andhra Pradesh who are followed through all three rounds of the Young Lives 
Panel Study.  
 
The identification strategy to be outlined in section 4 depends on the assumption 
that there is no selective attrition between NREGS (early phase-in) and late-NREGS (late 
phase-in) districts. To test this assumption, we estimate a linear probability model of 
attrition of the following kind: 
 
Attriti  = β0 + β1 NREGSi + β2 Yio + β3 NREGSi X Yio + β4 Xio + εi         (1) 
 
Where Attrit (=1 if dropped out of the sample, 0 otherwise) is regressed on baseline 
outcome variables (Yio), socioeconomic characteristics from baseline (Xio), NREGS (=1 
if assigned to the NREGS between rounds 1 and 2, 0 otherwise), and interaction between 
the NREGS and the pre-intervention outcome variables (NREGSi X Yio). We also 
examine the determinants of attrition controlling for baseline numeracy test scores, which 
are likely to be correlated with post-intervention initiation math test scores that are 
unavailable at baseline. The results are presented below in columns 1-5, Table 2.  
 
There are three important findings that emerge from Table 2. First, assignment to the 
NREGS is not related to attrition, the coefficient estimate on the NREGS is not 
statistically significant at even the 10% significance level, ruling out selective attrition 
between NREGS (early phase-in) and late-NREGS (late phase-in) districts. Second, pre-
intervention enrollment, grade progression, Raven’s test scores and writing test scores are 
all unrelated to sample attrition; the reading comprehension test scores are negatively 
related to attrition but only marginally significant. Baseline numeracy test scores are 
positively related to sample attrition suggesting negative selection into the sample as 
more-able children are likely to drop out of the sample over time. Third, positive/negative 
selection on baseline test scores would bias treatment effects only if this selection is 
correlated with the treatment indicator. The interaction terms between NREGS and pre-
intervention outcome variables are all statistically insignificant, that is, the null that there 
is no selective attrition based on differences in pre-intervention outcomes between 
NREGS (treatment/early phase-in) and late-NREGS (control/late phase-in) districts 
cannot be rejected at even the 10% significance level, thus ruling out attrition associated 
selection related to the critical baseline observables for this study. 
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Table 2: Linear Probability Model of Attrition 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Attrit Attrit Attrit Attrit Attrit 
NREGS  
 
-0.084 
(0.15) 
0.039 
(0.04) 
0.008 
(0.04) 
0.042 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Enrollment 
 
-0.113 
(0.14)     
NREGS*enrollment 
 
0.134 
(0.15)     
Grade progression 
  
-0.010 
(0.02)    
NREGS*grade progression 
  
0.008 
(0.04)    
Reading comprehension 
test scores   
-0.022* 
(0.013)   
NREGS*reading 
comprehension test scores   
0.017 
(0.02)   
Writing test scores 
    
-0.005 
(0.013)  
NREGS*writing test scores 
    
0.004 
(0.022)  
Numeracy test scores 
     
0.04** 
(0.02) 
NREGS*numeracy test 
scores 
     
0.02 
(0.034) 
 
Household size 
 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Number of school age 
children 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
Raven’s test scores 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Wealth index 
 
-0.018 
(0.07) 
-0.023 
(0.07) 
-0.012 
(0.07) 
-0.022 
(0.07) 
-0.034 
(0.07) 
Male dummy 
 
0.44 
(0.43) 
0.44 
(0.44) 
0.45 
(0.44) 
0.44 
(0.44) 
0.42 
(0.44) 
Age in months 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Male dummy*age in 
months 
 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
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SC/ST dummy 
 
-0.085* 
(0.05) 
-0.086* 
(0.05) 
-0.088* 
(0.05) 
-0.086* 
(0.05) 
-0.085* 
(0.05) 
OBC dummy 
 
-0.097** 
(0.047) 
-0.098** 
(0.047) 
-0.10** 
(0.048) 
-0.098** 
(0.048) 
-0.095** 
(0.047) 
Religion dummy 
 
0.018 
(0.031) 
0.019 
(0.031) 
0.022 
(0.031) 
0.020 
(0.031) 
0.015 
(0.032) 
Mother’s schooling 
 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Father’s schooling 
 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Constant 
 
-0.13 
(0.39) 
-0.23 
(0.35) 
-0.23 
(0.35) 
-0.24 
(0.34) 
-0.26 
(0.33) 
Sample size 757 757 757 757 757 
R-squared 0.041 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.044 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at 
the community level. The sample covers rural areas only. 
 
4. Conceptual framework 
 
The NREGS can impact children’s schooling outcomes through multiple channels, as 
noted above. An important effect of the scheme on children as noted earlier may be 
through improvements in parents’ labor force participation. There are several other 
channels as well, for instance, the public works projects implemented in the village can 
improve agricultural output for the household even without increasing labor force 
participation rates among parents. In addition, not all participants from the household 
registered under the NREGS are parents of the children in the sample. For instance, in 
2009-10 the Young Lives Panel Study obtains detailed information on the relationship of 
the NREGS worker to the young lives children. More than 25% of the NREGS workers 
were not biological parents of the sample child. Therefore, identifying the impact of the 
NREGS only through improvements in parents’ labor force participation rates would bias 
the estimated effect of the program. The direction of the bias is downward if important 
channels through which the program influences schooling have positive effects (and vice 
versa). Our aim here is to therefore estimate the intent-to-treat, that is, the total effect of 
the program on schooling outcomes and intellectual human capital.  
 
Our first two outcome variables of interest are enrollment and grade progression for 
which consistent data are available from all three rounds of the Young Lives Panel Study, 
which allows us to estimate the short-run (between rounds 1 and 2), medium-run 
(between rounds 2 and 3) and long-run (between rounds 1 and 3) effects of the early 
phase-in/exposure to the program between rounds 1 and 2. We combine spatial and 
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temporal variation in access to the program to compute the intent-to-treat effects of the 
program as specified by equation (2). 
 
Yit  = β0 + β1 NREGSi + β2 Time1t + β3 NREGS x Time1it + β4 Time2t + β5 NREGS x 
Time2it + εi  + εc + εh + εit         ( 2 ) 
 
NREGS is the usual treatment indicator, a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the 
child lives in a district that received early exposure (between rounds 1 and 2) to the 
employment guarantee scheme, 0 otherwise. The coefficient estimate on NREGS, β1 
captures all pre-existing differences between early exposure districts (treatment) and late 
exposure districts (control). Time1 is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the year is 
2007 (post-intervention), 0 otherwise. The coefficient estimate on Time1, β2 captures 
common time-effects for both treatment and control districts. The coefficient estimate on 
the interaction term (NREGS x Time1), β3 captures the short-run intent-to-treat effect of 
the NREGS, the relative increase in enrollment and grade progression between the pre- 
and post-intervention periods for children who lived in areas that were exposed to the 
NREGS between 2002 and 2007 (rounds 1 and rounds 2 of the Young Lives Panel Study) 
compared with those who were exposed to the program later between 2007 and 2009-10 
(rounds 2 and 3 of the Young Lives Panel Study). Time2 is a dummy variable that takes a 
value 1 if the year is 2009-10, 0 otherwise. The coefficient estimate on Time2, β4 once 
again captures common time-effects. The coefficient estimate on the interaction term 
(NREGS x Time2), β5 captures long-run effect of the program between rounds 1 and 3 of 
having early exposure to the program relative to late exposure. The difference between β5 
and β3 captures the additional/medium-run effect gained between rounds 2 and 3. If the 
medium-run effect is negative then we know that the control group tends to catch-up at 
least somewhat (entirely if the absolute magnitude of the medium-run effect is the same 
as the short-run effect) to the treatment group (early exposure districts) and if the 
additional effect remains positive then the effect of receiving early exposure to the 
program will have long-run persistent effects on schooling enrollment and grade 
progression that are greater than the short-run effects.  
 
The disturbance term in equation (2) includes four components. The first three (εi, εc, εh) 
are time invariant unobserved characteristics of the individual child, community and 
household, respectively. If these are not controlled in the estimation and if they are 
correlated with early phase-in of NRGES as seems likely given the effort to first target 
poorer areas, their presence will then bias the estimated NRGES effects downwards.  The 
fourth component (εit) is a random shock for the ith child in the tth period. 
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The other outcome variables of interest in this paper are reading comprehension test 
scores, writing test scores, math test scores and PPVT scores. All these measures are only 
available from two waves of the Young Lives Panel Study making it possible to only 
estimate either the short- or the medium-run effects of the program. The reading 
comprehension test scores and writing test scores are available from the 2002 and 2007 
waves of the Young Lives Panel Study making it possible to only estimate the short-run 
intent-to-treat effects of the program using a simple difference-in-difference specification 
(3). 
 
Yit  = β0 + β1 NREGSi + β2 Time1t + β3 NREGS x Time1it + εi  + εc + εh + εit          (3) 
 
As defined earlier, NREGS takes a value 1 if assigned to an early phase-in district 
(treatment) and 0 if assigned to a late phase-in district (control). The coefficient estimate 
on the NREGS dummy, β1 here again captures all pre-existing differences between 
children residing in the treatment and control districts. Time1 is a dummy variable that 
again takes a value 1 if year is 2007 (post-intervention period), 0 otherwise. The 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term (NREGS x Time1), β3 again captures the 
short-run intent-to-treat effect of the NREGS. It captures the relative increase in reading 
comprehension test scores and writing test scores between the pre- and post-intervention 
periods for children who live in treatment districts compared to children residing in the 
control districts. 
 
We make use of the two rounds of post-intervention data from the 2007 and 2009-10 
waves available on PPVT and math test scores to compute the medium-run/additional 
effect of early exposure to the NREGS. The NREGS dummy in equation (4) still takes a 
value 1 if assigned to an early phase-in district (treatment) and 0 if assigned to a late 
phase-in district (control). Time is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if year is 2009-
10, 0 otherwise.  
 
Yit  = β0 + β1 NREGSi + β2 Timet + β3 NREGS x Timeit + εi  + εc + εh + εit          (4) 
 
The coefficient estimate on the interaction term (NREGS x Time) β3 captures the 
additional/medium-run effect of the program beyond the short-run effect. A positive 
coefficient on the interaction term suggests that changes in test scores between rounds 2 
and 3 for the treatment group will be greater than observed changes in test scores 
between rounds 2 and 3 for the control districts that received the program later. This 
suggests that the effect of earlier exposure to the program is augmented in the long-run 
even after the control group starts receiving access to the program. On the contrary a 
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negative coefficient on the interaction term suggests that the control group tends to catch-
up to the treatment group.  
 
We know that the assignment to the NREGS program was not random; instead the 
program was purposely placed first in areas that have high concentrations of poor 
families (also see section 5.1). However, if we assume that program placement is 
correlated with individual (εi), household (εh), and or community (εc) specific time-
invariant unobservables that are additive in nature, then first-differencing the 
specification as done in the results section will sweep out all program placement effects 
allowing us to estimate the casual effect of the program on schooling outcomes and 
measures of intellectual human capital conditional on this specification. To obtain 
unbiased and consistent treatment effects, we still need to assume that– (a) there is no 
differential attrition between the treatment (early phase-in) and control (late phase-in) 
districts, we have shown this in section 3.3, and (b) treatment and control districts would 
have had parallel time trends in the absence of NREGS (see below). It is always a 
challenge to test the latter assumption since it requires several years of pre-intervention 
data on the outcome variables.  
 
To test the assumption of parallel time trends in the absence of the NREGS, we use data 
from the 2005 Indian Human Development Survey (Desai et. al 2005). The Indian 
Human Development Survey (IHDS) was administered between November 2004 and 
October 2005 and the first phase of the NREGS was rolled out only starting in September 
2005. The timing of the IHDS makes it suitable for examination of pre-intervention time 
trends. The IHDS has collected data on 5 (except Srikakulam) of the 6 Young Lives 
districts in rural Andhra Pradesh. In Appendix Figure A8 we plot years of schooling for 
children aged 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 years for the treatment (early phase-in districts) group 
and the control (late phase-in districts) group. Notice that the trends in years of schooling 
at different ages during the pre-intervention period are linear and parallel between the 
treatment and control districts. We also examine in Appendix Figure A9 years of 
schooling for different age groups (15-30 years, 30-40 years, 40-50 years, 50-75) years) 
in the treatment and control districts. Once again, we find parallel trends in accumulation 
of schooling in the treatment and control districts. Appendix Figures A8 and A9 both 
suggest that it is reasonable in our context at least to assume that the pre-intervention 
outcomes follow parallel trends between the treatment and control districts.14 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 We also examine pre-intervention reading comprehension test score and writing test score from the Indian Human 
Development Survey available only for a small sub-sample, 8-11 year old children. We find no difference in pre-
intervention reading comprehension test scores [p-value = 80] and the writing test scores [p-value = 0.17] between the 
treatment districts and control districts. The sample is too small to present disaggregated averages using plots. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Endogenous Program Placement 
In the absence of random assignment of districts to the NREGS, OLS estimation of 
equations (2)-(4) will not result in unbiased and consistent program effects since 
unobserved time-invariant individual (εi), household (εh) and community (εc) specific 
unobservables, as noted above, are likely to be correlated with assignment of districts to 
the NREGS between rounds 1 and 2. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986, 1988), Frankenberg 
and Thomas (2001), and Duflo (2001), among others, in different contexts have shown 
that true program effects are likely to be substantially biased in the presence of time-
invariant unobservables. To further understand the observed sources of placement we use 
data from round 1 (2002) to estimate the following placement equation: 
NREGSc  = β0 + β1 Yc0 + βj  Xjc + εc           (5) 
Since there are only six districts in our sample we cannot estimate the placement equation 
at the district level; instead we estimate equation (5) using data from 82 communities 
spread across the six Young Lives districts in Andhra Pradesh. The dependent variable in 
equation (5) takes a value 1 if assigned to receive the NREGS between rounds 1 and 2, 0 
otherwise. This is regressed upon a set of pre-intervention community level resources 
(Xs) and pre-intervention outcome variables (Yc0) averaged at the community-level. 
There is no pre-intervention data available on math and PPVT scores and therefore we 
include data from a pre-intervention numeracy test and Raven’s test administered in 
round 1 that are possibly closely related to the post-intervention initiation math and 
PPVTs administered in rounds 2 and 3. The regression results are reported in columns 1-
6, Table 3. Program placement here is negatively related to availability of electricity in 
the community, percentage of the population with secondary schooling or more and 
availability of community hospital and health center indicating that placement is fairly 
pro-poor and related to community level resources at baseline. Program placement is also 
positively related to community population. Pre-intervention outcome variables are rarely 
related to program placement except for grade progression, which is negatively related to 
early phase-in of the NREGS. Treatment assignment here is significantly related to 
observed variables that generally indicate pro-poor placement. This is further suggestive 
that unobserved variables are also likely to be associated with pro-poor placement. If so, 
j=2
R
∑
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then failure to control for these unobserved variables would probably result in downward 
biases in estimated program effects.15 
 
Table 3: Determinants of Program Placement 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
NREGS NREGS NREGS NREGS NREGS NREGS 
Enrollment 
 
0.40 
(0.34)      
Grade progression 
  
-0.51** 
(0.22)     
Writing test scores 
    
-0.08 
(0.13)   
Numeracy test 
scores     
-0.08 
(0.32)  
Raven’s test scores 
      
0.02 
(0.017) 
Electricity (=1 if 
electricity available, 
0 otherwise) 
-0.11 
(0.14) 
 
-0.28* 
(0.14) 
 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
 
-0.12 
(0.12) 
 
Secondary 
Education (% of the 
population with 
secondary education 
and or more) 
-0.32 
(0.45) 
 
 
 
-0.32 
(0.45) 
 
 
 
-0.32 
(0.45) 
 
 
 
-0.32 
(0.45) 
 
 
 
-0.32 
(0.45) 
 
 
 
-0.40 
(0.47) 
 
 
 
Population (in 000s) 
 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.085** 
(0.04) 
0.87** 
(0.04) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.088** 
(0.04) 
Water (=1 if 
drinking water is 
available, 0 
otherwise) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
 
 
0.10 
(0.09) 
 
 
0.11 
(0.09) 
 
 
0.10 
(0.10) 
 
 
0.11 
(0.09) 
 
 
0.09 
(0.10) 
 
 
Hospital (=1 if 
public or private 
hospital is available, 
0 otherwise) 
-0.29** 
(0.13) 
 
 
-0.26** 
(0.13) 
 
 
-0.26** 
(0.13) 
 
 
-0.27** 
(0.13) 
 
 
-0.27** 
(0.13) 
 
 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
 
 
Health center (=1 if 
health center or 
health post 
-0.31** 
(0.13) 
 
-0.27** 
(0.14) 
 
-0.30** 
(0.13) 
 
-0.31*** 
(0.13) 
 
-0.30** 
(0.13) 
 
-0.31** 
(0.13) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 A similar picture emerges from examining the 2005 Indian Human Development Survey. We find that on average 
households residing in the treatment districts (early phase-in districts) are more likely to be below the poverty line in 
comparison to the control districts (late phase-in districts). 
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available, 0 
otherwise) 
Constant 
 
0.50 
(0.41) 
1.42*** 
(0.26) 
1.04*** 
(0.20) 
0.98*** 
(0.22) 
0.99*** 
(0.37) 
0.43 
(0.41) 
Sample size 82 82 82 82 82 82 
R-squared 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The sample covers rural areas only. 
         
  5.2 Intent-to-treat effects 
To address selection on time-invariant unobservables, including those related to program 
placement as well as at the household and individual level, we estimate equations (2)-(4) 
using the first-difference OLS estimation strategy. The intent-to-treat effects of the 
NREGS on enrollment, grade progression, reading comprehension test scores, writing 
test scores, math test scores in percentile ranks and PPVT scores in percentile ranks are 
reported in Table 4. In Table 4, Panel A the impact estimates are reported without any 
pre-intervention controls. To improve the precision of our impact estimates in Table 4, 
Panel B we control for a set of pre-intervention socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics. The set of pre-interventions controls included in the regressions are 
summarized in Table 1, Panel B. 
 
Our preferred estimates for the short-run (2002-2007), medium-run/additional (2007-
2009/10) and long-run (2002-2009/10) intent-to-treat effects of the NREGS on 
enrollment and grade progression are reported in Table 4, Panel B. We find that there is 
no impact of the NREGS on enrollment in both the short- and medium-run. Enrollment 
captures short run investments in schooling and in the absence of continuous waves of 
measurement does not fully reflect cumulative investments in schooling that may have 
occurred differentially in the NREGS districts during the post-intervention period. Grade 
progression is a better measure of cumulative investments in schooling. We find that the 
NREGS has a positive and statistically significant effect on grade progression in the short 
run, medium run and long run. We find that children residing in districts that receive the 
NREGS between rounds 1 and 2 on average get 8% closer to their potential grades 
compared to children residing in late phase-in districts during this period. We find that 
the effects in the short run continue to persist even after the program is phased-in to the 
late phase-in NREGS districts between rounds 2 and 3. We find that in the long run, 
children residing in districts that receive the NREGS between rounds 1 and 2 are on 
average 11% closer to their potential grades by round 3 compared to children who receive 
the NREGS only between rounds 2 and 3. We find the additional/medium-run ITT effects 
observed between rounds 2 and 3 reported in Table 4, Panel B are positive and 
statistically significant, augmenting the short-run impact estimates, suggesting that there 
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is no decay of the short-run treatment effects. However, note that the gains from 
receiving the program early on remain significant pointing to the value of receiving 
interventions during primary school. 
 
Improvements in grade progression reflect both improvements in enrollment and lower 
rates of grade repetition. Since we find no effects on enrollment, the improvements in 
grade progression are likely to accrue from improvements in performance that are 
manifested in part by reduced grade repetition. The persistence of these effects is not 
surprising because children who received access to the program between rounds 1 and 2 
were between ages 11 and 12 years while children who received the program by round 3 
were almost 13-14 years when a greater proportion of these children are not even likely 
to be in school.  
 
Table 4: ITT Effects of the NREGS  
 
 Enrollment 
(1) 
Grade 
progre
ssion 
(2) 
Reading 
comprehension 
test scores 
(3) 
Writing 
test 
scores 
(4) 
Math test 
scores (in 
percentile 
ranks) 
(5) 
PPVT 
scores 
(in 
percentile  
ranks) 
(6) 
Panel A: ITT effects without baseline controls 
NREGS x 
Time1 
(2002-2007) 
Short-run effect 
-0.022 
(0.03) 
0.063* 
(0.03) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
  
NREGS x 
Time2 
(2002-2009/10) 
long-run effect 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
    
NREGS x Time 
(2007-2009/10) 
Medium-run 
effect 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
  5.65 
(3.98) 
11.65*** 
(3.89) 
Panel B: ITT effects with baseline controls 
NREGS x 
Time1 
(2002-2007) 
Short-run effect 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.31*** 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
  
NREGS x 
Time2 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.11*** 
(0.037) 
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(2002-2009/10) 
long-run effect 
NREGS x Time 
(2007-2009/10) 
Medium-run 
effect 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.032** 
(0.012) 
  5.78* 
(3.45) 
11.88*** 
(3.53) 
Mean of late 
phase-in 
districts 
(control) 
-0.09 
(0.32) 
-0.012 
(0.20) 
0.50 
(1.13) 
0.34 
(0.92) 
-3.71 
(33.03) 
-7.65 
(30.03) 
Sample size 1406 1406 703 703 703 703 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the community level. The pre-intervention controls included in 
Panel B are male dummy, age in months, male dummy interacted with age in months, wealth index, household size, 
number of school age children, SC/ST dummy, OBC dummy, religion dummy, Raven’s test scores, mother’s schooling 
and father’s schooling. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The sample covers rural areas only. 
 
We use pre (2002) and post (2007) intervention data on reading comprehension test 
scores and writing test scores to compute the short-run intent-to-treat effects of the 
NREGS. We find that the program in a short time improved average reading 
comprehension test scores by 0.31 and average writing test scores by 0.10 as reported in 
columns 3 and 4 Table 4, Panel B though the effects on writing scores are not statistically 
significant at even the 10% level. The improvement in reading comprehension is 
augmented in the medium run (additional effects between rounds 2 and 3 of exposure to 
the program between rounds 1 and 2) as depicted by the improvement in PPVT scores of 
receptive vocabulary reported in column 6 Table 4, Panel B.  
 
We use two rounds of post-intervention initiation data from the 2007 and 2009/10 to 
compute the additional/medium-run effect of early exposure to the NREGS between 
rounds 1 and 2 on improvements in PPVT and math test scores between rounds 2 and 3. 
The additional effect of the NREGS on math test scores is reported in column 5 Table 4, 
Panel B and indicates that children residing in the early phase-in districts scored 6 
percentage points higher on math tests compared to children residing in the late-phase-in 
districts. The additional effect of NREGS on PPVT scores reported in column 6 Table 4, 
Panel B indicates that children residing in early phase-in districts are likely to score 
almost 12 percentage points higher on the PPVT compared to children residing in the 
late-phase-in districts.16  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 We impute PPVT and math test scores for 4% and 7% of the panel sample respectively. We re-estimate our preferred 
specification for PPVT and math test scores in percentile ranks for the smaller panel sample of 672 and 652 observations 
respectively, for whom there are no missing test scores. We find that the medium-run intent-to-treat effects of the NREGS 
on math and PPVT scores in percentile ranks are 4.18 (s.e=3.40) and 12.83 (s.e=3.48) respectively. These effects are not 
significantly different from the estimates reported in Table 4, Panel B at even the 10% significance level.  
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5.3 Index measures 
The probability of a false positive, that is, Type I error, increases in the number of 
outcomes tested.  Since we examine the impact of the NREGS for six outcome variables, 
we would like to lessen the possibility of a false positive. To do so we use the method 
outlined in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). We construct index1 by combining 
enrollment, grade progression, reading comprehension test scores and writing test scores 
to measure the short-run intent-to-treat effect of the NREGS using pre (2002) and post-
intervention data from 2007 rounds of the Young Lives Panel Study. Similarly, we 
construct index2 by combining enrollment, grade progression, math test scores in 
percentile ranks and PPVT scores in percentile ranks using two rounds of post-
intervention data from 2007 and 2009-10 to measure the additional/medium-run effect of 
early exposure to NREGS compared to late phase-in of the program. This index method 
requires us to first convert the outcome variables into standardized outcomes, where the 
standardized outcomes are constructed using the mean and the standard deviation of the 
control group (late phase-in districts) as the reference category. Note that higher values in 
the outcome variable must consistently indicate better performance. We take an equally 
weighted average of all the standardized outcomes within a domain to construct these 
indices.  
 
We estimate equations (3) and (4) for index1 and index2 respectively. Once again, 
equations (3) and (4) are estimated in first-differences and these specifications control for 
a full set of pre-intervention characteristics on the right side. The associated impact 
estimates are reported in Table 5. The short- and medium-run intent-to-treat effects of the 
NREGS are statistically significant. In the short run, assignment to the NREGS districts 
increases schooling outcomes by 0.10 standard deviation and in the medium run, early 
exposure to the NREGS increases intellectual human capital by an additional 0.16 
standard deviations compared to children residing in the control/late phase-in districts. 
The null that NREGS has no effect on intellectual human capital can be rejected at the 
10% and 5% significance levels in the short run and the medium run, alleviating concerns 
relating to incorrect inference that comes with the use of multiple outcome variables.  
 
Table 5: ITT Effects and Average Effect Size of the NREGS 
 
 Index1 
(1) 
Index2 
(2) 
Panel A: ITT effects with baseline controls 
NREGS x Time1 
(2002-2007) 
0.10* 
(0.06) 
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short-run effect 
NREGS x Time 
(2007-2009/10) 
medium-run effect 
 0.16** 
(0.06) 
 
Panel B: Average effect size with baseline controls    
 (1) (2) 
NREGS x Time1 
(2002-2007) 
short-run effect 
0.08* 
(0.05) 
 
NREGS x Time 
(2007-2009/10) 
medium-run effect 
 0.15** 
(0.06) 
Sample size 703 703 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the community level. The pre-intervention 
controls included in panels A and B are male dummy, age in months, male dummy interacted with age in 
months, wealth index, household size, number of school age children, SC/ST dummy, OBC dummy, religion 
dummy, Raven’s test scores, mother’s schooling and father’s schooling. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
The sample covers rural areas only. 
 
As a further check of our ITT effects we also compute average effect size using the 
method outlined in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) and Clingingsmith et. al (2009). The 
average effect size is constructed by taking a weighted average of the individual 
treatment effects within a domain of related outcomes computed using a system of 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) equations to allow for correlation between the 
error terms across equations. This method improves the precision of the treatment effects 
thereby reducing type II error, that is, the risk of attaining low statistical power.17 The 
average effect size for the short-run treatment effects are reported in column 1 Table 5, 
panel B takes an average over standardized (z-score) measures of – enrollment, grade 
progression, reading comprehension test scores and writing test scores. The average 
effect size can only be interpreted with ease if the units of measurement for the different 
outcome variables are same. In this case they are all measured in terms of the standard 
deviation units of the control group. Similarly, we compute the average effect size for the 
medium-run treatment effects reported in column 2 Table 5, panel B taking an average 
over standardized (z-score) measures of – enrollment, grade progression, math test scores 
in percentile ranks and PPVT scores in percentile ranks. We find that assignment to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The ITT effects obtained from the SUR regressions are reported in Appendix Table A1. Notice the treatment effects 
reported here have lower standard errors compared to the estimates reported in Table 4 owing to higher precision. 
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NREGS districts between rounds 1 and 2 increases the short-run average effect size by 
0.08 standard deviation units and the medium-run average effect size by 0.15 standard 
deviation units. Notice the additional/medium-run effects are positive and significantly 
greater than the short-run effects. This gain is primarily due to the large gains observed in 
the math and PPVT scores in percentile ranks observed between rounds 2 and 3. 
 
To our knowledge, we are the first to evaluate the impact of public works programs on 
intellectual human capital using performance on reading, writing, math and vocabulary 
(PPVT). Hence, we cannot compare the magnitude of our effects to other public works 
programs. However, we can compare the impact estimates with the effects obtained from 
conditional cash transfer programs aimed at poverty alleviation. Fiszbein and Schady 
(2009) in their review of CCT programs show that pre-school interventions are more 
effective in improving test scores as found in Nicaragua and Ecuador [Paxson and 
Schady (2010), Macours et. al (2012)] in comparison to CCT interventions targeted 
among school-age children as found in Mexico and Cambodia [Behrman et. al (2005), 
Filmer and Schady (2011)]. The magnitude of the average effect size for Nicaragua and 
Ecuador (poorest 10%) varies between 0.13 and 0.18 standard deviation improvements in 
the distribution of test scores. In our sample a 0.31 improvement in the reading 
comprehension test scores translates into a 0.25 standard deviation improvement in 
reading comprehension/vocabulary, a 6 percentage point increase in math test scores in 
percentile rank translates into a 0.20 standard deviation improvement in math, and a 12 
percentage point increase in PPVT scores in percentile rank translates into an 
approximately 0.40 standard deviation improvement in receptive vocabulary. The 
average effect size computed here in the short run results in a 0.08 standard deviation 
improvement in cognitive outcomes and in the medium run the effects are sustained and 
results in a 0.15 standard deviation improvement in test scores. The impact estimates 
reported here are close to the impact estimates reported for two CCT programs in 
Nicaragua (Macours et. al 2012, Barham et. al 2013) and also for a pre-school nutrition 
program implemented in Guatemala (Maluccio et. al 2009). 
 
5.4 Gender Differential Treatment Effects 
The NREGS specifically aims to improve women’s labor force participation by assigning 
at least one-third of all beneficiaries of the scheme to be women. Azam (2011) show that 
the scheme was successful in achieving this target as the labor force participation rate 
among women was substantially higher in the post-intervention period compared to male 
labor force participation rates. These differences in gender-specific labor force 
participation rates could result in differential impact estimates for male and female 
children if fathers and mothers differentially direct resources to their sons versus their 
daughters. Thomas (1994) and Duflo (2000) show that changes in income and resources 
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among fathers and grandfathers only benefit their sons and grandsons. Similarly changes 
in income and resources for mothers and grandmothers only trickle down to their 
daughters and granddaughters. Our aim here is to examine if the NREGS results in 
differential effects for male and female children. The preferred intent-to-treat effects 
reported in Table 4 are now separately estimated for males and females in Table 6. 
 
The intent-to-treat effect of the NREGS for male children is reported in Table 6, Panel A. 
The impact estimates show that the scheme is positively related to schooling enrollment 
for sons though the effect is not significant. We find that the scheme is positively and 
significantly related to grade progression. Male children residing in the early phase-in 
program districts in the short run are 9% and in the long run 12% closer to their potential 
grades compared to male children residing in the late phase-in districts. We find that 
improvements in enrollment and grade progression do not translate to improvements in 
measures of intellectual human capital for sons as captured by the ITT effects on reading 
comprehension test scores, writing test scores, math test scores in percentile ranks and 
PPVT scores in percentile ranks. 
  
The intent-to-treat effects of the NREGS for females is reported in Table 6, Panel B. 
Female enrollment drops by 12 percentage points in the long-run though this decline does 
not affect grade progression. We find that female children residing in early phase-in 
districts are 5% and 9% closer to their potential grades in the short- and medium-runs 
respectively. We find that in the short run reading comprehension test scores increase by 
almost 40 percentage points. We observe similar positive effects of early phase-in of the 
program in the medium run with a 15 percentage point increase in math test scores in 
percentile ranks and a 17 percentage point increase in PPVT scores in percentile ranks 
among females. It appears that male children benefit from both staying longer in school 
and reductions in grade repetition whereas, female children appear to benefit primarily 
from reductions in grade repetition and positive-selection into enrollment. 
 
Table 6: ITT Effects of the NREGS by Gender  
 
 Enrollment 
(1) 
Grade 
progressi
on 
(2) 
Reading 
comprehe
nsion test 
scores 
(3) 
Writing 
test 
scores 
(4) 
Math test 
scores 
(in 
percentile 
ranks) 
(5) 
PPVT 
scores 
(in 
percentile 
ranks) 
(6) 
Panel A: Male 
NREGS x 0.025 0.09** 0.20 0.06   
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Time1 
(2002-2007) 
short-run 
effect 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.12) 
NREGS x 
Time2 
(2002-
2009/10) 
long-run effect 
-0.004 
(0.05) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
    
NREGS x 
Time 
(2007-
2009/10) 
medium-run 
effect 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
  -3.59 
(3.82) 
6.66* 
(3.84) 
Mean of late 
phase-in 
districts 
(control) 
-0.09 
(0.32) 
-0.02 
(0.22) 
0.50 
(1.12) 
0.39 
(0.92) 
6.42 
(30.73) 
-0.36 
(26.60) 
Sample size 684 684 342 342 342 342 
Panel B: Female 
NREGS x 
Time1 
(2002-2007) 
short-run 
effect 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.38*** 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
  
NREGS x 
Time2 
(2002-
2009/10) 
long-run effect 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
    
NREGS x 
Time 
(2007-
2009/10) 
medium-run 
effect 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.03** 
(0.02) 
  15.7*** 
(4.61) 
16.82*** 
(4.34) 
Mean of late 
phase-in 
districts 
(control) 
-0.08 
(0.33) 
-0.007 
(0.18) 
0.50 
(1.05) 
0.29 
(0.91) 
-13.60 
(32.32) 
-14.77 
(31.55) 
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Sample size 722 722 361 361 361 361 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the community level. The pre-intervention controls included 
in panels A and B are male dummy, age in months, male dummy interacted with age in months, wealth index, household 
size, number of school age children, SC/ST dummy, OBC dummy, religion dummy, Raven’s test scores, mother’s 
schooling and father’s schooling. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The sample covers rural areas only. 
 
Following the methods outlined in section 5.3, we also compute short- and medium-run 
intent-to-treat effects using the index measures and the average effect size over multiple 
domains of related outcomes for the male and female sub-samples in Table 7. The short- 
and medium-run ITT effects on the index measures are reported in columns 1 and 2 Table 
7, Panel A. We find that the program has no impact on male schooling and cognitive 
outcomes in either the short run or the medium run. However, the program has benefitted 
females a little in the short run but substantially more in the medium-run. These are 
consistent with the positive findings on grade progression but no effects on test scores for 
males and the overall positive findings on grade progression and test scores for females. 
 
Table 7: ITT Effects and Average Effect Size of the NREGS  
 
 Index1 
(1) 
Male 
Index2 
(2) 
Male 
Index1 
(3) 
Female 
Index2 
(4) 
Female 
Panel A: ITT effects with baseline controls 
NREGS x Time1 
(2002-2007) 
short-run effect 
0.14 
(0.09) 
 0.05 
(0.08) 
 
NREGS x Time 
(2007-2009/10) 
medium-run effect 
 0.04 
(0.07) 
 
 0.29*** 
(0.08) 
 
Panel B: Average effect size with baseline controls 
 (1) 
Male 
(2) 
Male 
(3) 
Female 
(4) 
Female 
NREGS x Time1 
(2002-2007) 
short-run effect 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
 0.04 
(0.08) 
 
NREGS x Time 
(2007-2009/10) 
medium-run effect 
 0.05 
(0.07) 
 0.26*** 
(0.08) 
Sample size 342 342 361 361 
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Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the community level. The pre-intervention controls 
included in panels A and B are male dummy, age in months, male dummy interacted with age in months, wealth 
index, household size, number of school age children, SC/ST dummy, OBC dummy, religion dummy, Raven’s test 
scores, mother’s schooling and father’s schooling. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The sample covers rural areas 
only. 
 
The index measures reported in Table 7, Panel A do not account for correlation in the 
errors across equations. However, the average effect size reported in Table 7, Panel B 
accounts for this correlation improving the precision of the estimates (reducing standard 
errors). Male children residing in districts that receive the program between rounds 1 and 
2 experience approximately a 0.11 standard deviation units improvement in schooling 
and cognitive outcomes in the short run. Whereas in the medium run the effects of 
receiving the program early on (between rounds 1 and 2) relative to receiving the 
program later on (between rounds 2 and 3) is only marginally greater but insignificant for 
males but notably larger and significant for females. The magnitude of the medium run 
effects are almost five times higher for females compared to males suggesting that timing 
of interventions matter more for females than males. 
 
  5.5 Spillover Effects 
The NREGS is also found to improve welfare outcomes in urban areas. Ravi, Kapoor and 
Ahluwalia (2013) show that access to the NREGS in rural areas has reduced rural-urban 
migration rates and reduced urban unemployment rates by 7 percentage points. This 
spillover effect on improved employment and earnings is also likely to result in 
improvements in human capital outcomes in urban areas. To examine the extent spillover 
effects generated through access to the NREGS, we re-estimate our preferred 
specifications now restricting the analysis sample to urban areas. The spillover effect of 
the NREGS is provided in Table 8 and is replicated for our preferred specification 
reported in Table 4, panel B. We find that in general the program is positively associated 
with improvements in schooling outcomes with most significant effects on grade 
progression.  
 
Table 8: ITT Effects of the NREGS for Urban Sample 
 
 Enrollment 
(1) 
Grade 
progressi
on 
(2) 
Reading 
comprehens
ion test 
scores 
(3) 
Writing 
test 
scores 
(4) 
Math test 
scores 
(in 
percentile 
ranks) 
(5) 
PPVT 
scores 
(in 
percentile 
ranks) 
(6) 
Panel A: ITT effects with baseline controls 
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NREGS x Time1 
(2002-2007) 
short-run effect 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.21 
(0.13) 
-0.09 
(0.15) 
  
NREGS x Time2 
(2002-2009/10) 
long-run effect 
0.0006 
(0.05) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
    
NREGS x Time 
(2007-2009/10) 
medium-run 
effect 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.0003 
(0.02) 
  -0.54 
(3.41) 
11.16 
(8.80) 
Mean of late 
phase-in districts 
(control) 
-0.07 
(0.27) 
0.007 
(0.27) 
0.29 
(0.89) 
0.30 
(0.82) 
-0.13 
(27.15) 
-5.87 
(31.17) 
Sample size 448 448 224 224 224 224 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the community level. The pre-intervention controls included in 
panel A are male dummy, age in months, male dummy interacted with age in months, wealth index, household size, number 
of school age children, SC/ST dummy, OBC dummy, religion dummy, Raven’s test scores, mother’s schooling and father’s 
schooling. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The sample covers urban areas only. 
 
5.6 Other programs? 
Two other popular government programs in India – the mid day meal scheme and the 
integrated child development services program (ICDS) are often associated with 
improvements in children’s health and schooling outcomes [Dercon et. al 2013; Afridi 
2010, 2011; Khera, 2006]. The ICDS program is only targeted to children between 0-6 
years and therefore none of the school age children in our sample are eligible for the 
ICDS scheme. Consequently, the NREGS effects are not likely to be confounded by any 
pre-school participation in the ICDS scheme. The mid day meal scheme is the 
governments flagship program aimed at keeping children enrolled in school. In October 
2007 the government of India expanded access of the mid day meal scheme to target not 
just primary school age children enrolled in classes 1-5 but expanded the beneficiaries of 
the mid day meal scheme to include all children enrolled in classes 1-8. This expansion 
took effect in all government schools in India and would be captured by the time 
dummies specified in our preferred equations. Finally, we find that more than 90% of 
children in our sample are enrolled in government schools in both treatment and control 
districts and experience similar levels of exposure to the mid day meal scheme, and 
therefore the treatment effects can be accrued to only the NREGS effects.  
 
5.7 Robustness 
Since enrollment is defined as a dichotomous variable, OLS estimates reported in Table 4 
are not likely to provide us with consistent and unbiased treatment effects. To address 
this concern, we estimate the treatment effects using conditional logit fixed-effects 
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estimator. The conditional logit fixed-effects estimates for enrollment are reported in 
column 1, Table 9. The short run and medium run impact estimates suggest no effect of 
the NREGS on enrollment. These results are consistent with the preferred first-difference 
OLS estimates reported in column 1, Panel B, Table 4. 
 
As described in the data section, our reading comprehension test scores and writing test 
scores capture ordered choices and once again OLS estimation would not yield consistent 
and unbiased estimates. To obtain consistent estimates, we modify the ordered choices 
into a binary choice model where the modified reading comprehension test score takes a 
value 1 if the child can read words and or read sentences, 0 otherwise. The modified 
writing test score takes a value 1 if the child can write without difficulties, 0 otherwise. 
Once again we employ the conditional logit fixed-effects estimation strategy to obtain the 
short run impact estimates on the modified reading and writing test scores reported in 
columns 2 and 3, Table 9 below. We find that these estimates are similar to the OLS 
estimates reported in Table 4, Panel B. 
 
Table 9: Conditional Logit-Fixed Effects Estimates for Enrollment and 
Reading and Writing Test Scores 
 
 Enrollment 
(1) 
MLE 
Modified reading 
comprehension test 
scores 
(2) 
MLE 
Modified 
writing test 
scores 
(3) 
MLE 
NREGS x Time1 
(2002-2007) 
Short-run effect 
-0.045 
(0.66) 
0.69* 
(0.40) 
0.20 
(0.27) 
NREGS x Time2 
(2002-2009/10) 
long-run effect 
-0.70 
(0.78) 
  
Sample size 546 520  
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The sample covers rural areas only. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Public works programs are often seen as critical policy instruments for decreasing 
unemployment rates, facilitating consumption smoothing, creating assets and alleviating 
multidimensional poverty. Yet, existing cost-effectiveness analyses of public works 
program do not take into account the spillover effects of the program that accrue to the 
next generation (Ravallion 1991). This is partly due to the unavailability of evaluation 
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studies in this area. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the impact of a 
public works program on grade progression, reading comprehension test scores, writing 
test scores, math test scores and PPVT scores.  
 
We use longitudinal data from the 2002 (round 1), 2007 (round 2) and 2009-10 (round 3) 
waves of the Young Lives Panel Study administered in Andhra Pradesh, India to assess 
the impact of the world’s largest public works program, the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme on measures of intellectual human capital. The NREGS was phased-in 
two of the four young lives districts between rounds 1 and 2 and phased-in to the 
remaining four districts by round 3. We combine pre- and two rounds of post-intervention 
initiation data from the Young Lives Panel Study in a quasi-experimental framework to 
capture the short- and medium-run intent-to-treat effects of having access to the NREGS 
on schooling enrollment, grade progression, reading comprehension test scores, writing 
test scores, and performance on math test and PPVT. 
  
A number of important findings emerge from our analysis. First, we find that NREGS 
was primarily placed initially in poor communities. We find that communities that have 
higher levels of pre-intervention population, and fewer hospitals and health centers were 
more likely to receive the program first. Therefore the control for program placement in 
our estimates through first-differencing is important to avoid biases because there 
probably are important unobserved as well as observed pro-poor determinants of program 
placement. Second, the NREGS has no effect on schooling enrollment, a short-run 
measure of investment in intellectual human capital. Third, access to the program has 
large and positive effects on children’s performance on reading comprehension test, math 
test and PPVT. The impact estimates vary between 0.25 and 0.40 standard deviations. 
The average effect size computed over several outcomes is 0.08 in the short run and 0.15 
in the medium run and is similar to the estimates found for CCT programs in Latin 
America. Fourth, short-run effects of the program are all sustained and indeed generally 
augmented in the medium-run, that is, there is no decaying of observed treatment effects. 
Fifth, the average effects size for males do not vary between the short and medium run. 
This suggests more catch-up among male children in the control districts. However, the 
impact of receiving the intervention earlier is substantially large for females suggesting 
little catch-up among females. Finally, our impact estimates are robust to a number of 
other concerns – attrition bias, type I errors, type II errors and endogenous placement. 
 
Observed improvements in children’s human capital accumulation can operate either via 
improvement in household monthly per capita consumption expenditure and or 
improvement in community infrastructure and or other smoothening mechanisms. The 
Young Lives Panel Study did not collect any pre-intervention data on per capita 
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household consumption expenditure, however, a simple comparison of the post-
intervention household monthly per capita consumption expenditure from round 2 
between the early phase-in and late phase-in districts in rural Andhra Pradesh suggest that 
on average children residing in the early phase-in districts experienced an almost 40% 
increase in household monthly per capita consumption expenditure relative to children 
residing in the late phase-in districts. We find that these differences continue to persist 
through round 3. We also find that children residing in households registered for the 
NREGS in rounds 2 and 3 report 10% and 18% higher per capita consumption 
expenditures compared to children residing in households that did not register for the 
NREGS in rounds 2 and 3 respectively. We find that the increase is in per capita 
consumption expenditures for registered households is smaller and is reflective of the 
potential spill over effects operating through larger public goods available in the 
community that are beneficial to both households registered and non-registered in the 
NREGS districts therefore, reiterating the importance of using an intent-to-treat effect 
approach to impact evaluation. 
 
Our findings have several important policy implications. One, public works program can 
be extremely beneficial in improving children’s human capital. Two, cost-effectiveness 
analysis of public works program based solely on outcomes such as labor force 
participation and income are likely to underestimate the total gains from such programs 
that are likely to accrue at both the household level and the individual level including 
children. Moreover, effects on intellectual human capital are likely to have substantial 
spillover effects and intergenerational effects, which are not easily measurable. Third, the 
gains from receiving the program early on remain significant pointing to the value of 
receiving interventions during primary school. Fourth, the timing of these interventions is 
critical particularly for females.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Enrollment by Age in years for rural AP using IHDS 
 
 
Source: 2005 Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) 
 
Figure A2: Distribution of raw Math test scores in 2007 for rural AP 
 
 
Source: Young Lives Panel Study 
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Figure A3: Distribution of raw Math test scores in 2009 for rural AP 
 
 
Source: Young Lives Panel Study 
 
Figure A4: Distribution of raw PPVT scores in 2007 for rural AP 
 
 
Source: Young Lives Panel Study 
0
5
10
0 125
2007
Pe
rc
en
t
PPVT test scores
	   40	  
Figure A5: Distribution of raw PPVT scores in 2009 for rural AP 
 
 
Source: Young Lives Panel Study 
 
Figure A6: Distribution of Math test scores in percentile ranks by year for rural AP 
 
 
Source: Young Lives Panel Study 
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Figure A7: Distribution of PPVT scores in percentile ranks by year for rural AP 
 
 
Source: Young Lives Panel Study 
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Figure A8: Pre-intervention Years of Schooling by Age in Years 
 
 
                  Source: 2005 Indian Human Development Survey. Years of schooling is same as grades of schooling. 
Figure A9: Pre-intervention Years of Schooling by Age Groups 
 
 
                 Source: 2005 Indian Human Development Survey. Years of schooling is same as grades of schooling. 
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Table A1: ITT Effects of the NREGS from a SUR Framework 
 
 Enrollment 
(1) 
Grade 
progre
ssion 
(2) 
Reading 
comprehensi
on test scores 
(3) 
Writing 
test 
scores 
(4) 
Math test 
scores (in 
percentile 
ranks) 
(5) 
PPVT 
scores 
(in 
percentile  
ranks) 
(6) 
Panel A: ITT effects with baseline controls 
NREGS x 
Time1 
(2002-2007) 
Short-run 
effect 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.31** 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
  
NREGS x 
Time 
(2007-
2009/10) 
Medium-run 
effect 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
  0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.42*** 
(0.12) 
Sample size 703 703 703 703 703 703 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the community level. The pre-intervention controls included in 
panel A are male dummy, age in months, male dummy interacted with age in months, wealth index, household size, 
number of school age children, SC/ST dummy, OBC dummy, religion dummy, Raven’s test scores, mother’s schooling 
and father’s schooling. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The sample covers only rural areas. The short-run effects 
correspond to the average effect size reported in column 1 Table 5, panel B and the medium-run effects correspond to the 
average effect size reported in column 2 Table 5, panel B. 
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Table A2: ITT Effects of the NREGS on Grade Progression 
 
 Grade progression 
(1) 
NREGS x Time1 
(2002-2007) 
Short-run effect 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
NREGS x Time 
(2007-2009/10) 
Medium-run effect 
0.011*** 
(0.03) 
Sample size 703 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the community level. The pre-intervention controls 
included are male dummy, age in months, male dummy interacted with age in months, wealth index, household 
size, number of school age children, SC/ST dummy, OBC dummy, religion dummy, Raven’s test scores, 
mother’s schooling and father’s schooling. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The sample covers only rural 
areas.  
 
